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Introduction  
The orthodox picture of relationships between the state and the voluntary (third) sector from 
the post-war period is generally one of mutual dependence and a balanced ‘partnership’ in 
which, occasional conflicts notwithstanding, governments generally refrained from arbitrarily 
restricting civil society actors.i In practice, the model largely applies to ‘service providing’ 
charitable and philanthropic agencies which carry out various welfare and public service 
functions on the state’s behalf. Concurrently, academics, policy commentators and activists 
have warned of the potential incorporation of charities into a ‘shadow [penal] state’ii to the 
detriment of the sector’s distinctive, humanitarian, relatively autonomous and publicly 
legitimate standing.  
 
But whereas this commentary has focused on the potential subornment of the voluntary sector 
by the state, we are witnessing more complex and challenging formations arising from the 
growing influence of private capital in public services. The field of criminal justice has been 
no exception to the wave of privatisation and outsourcing in a mixed market where for-profit 
and voluntary sector providers contract to augment, or replace, state penal and rehabilitative 
services. Consequently, the voluntary sector is supposedly being pulled further towards 
market competition, state patronage and induction into the criminal justice apparatus.  The 
state-voluntary sector dyad is rapidly evolving into fluid, tripartite arrangements comprising 
private capital, statutory bodies and charities. This poses some fundamental questions with 
respect to the power relations which inhere in these combinations, the further blurring of their 
functions, and the extent to which private (non-state) agencies ought to be accountable as 
public entities.   
 
This article draws on some findings from a research project which investigated penal 
voluntary sector adaptation to the mixed market in criminal justice services.iii The first 
section will reprise the dominant trends in aligning state relationships with the voluntary 
sector from the 1980s to the present. The second half of the article will outline some of our 
main findings about the contemporary adaptive experiences, situations and practices of the 
voluntary sector in criminal justice resettlement. The evidence shows that the (i) the 
voluntary sector either outwardly complies with, or in a minority of cases, actively embraces, 
competitive marketised models; (ii) that the sector increasingly normalises organisational 
efficiency and greater alignment with bureaucratic practices, and (iii) most VSOs reported 
conflicts between prioritising long-term financial viability with their founding ‘ethos and 
values’.  We conclude that while many voluntary sector organisations have successfully 
adjusted to market and bureaucratic norms, aspects of that repositioning have been at a cost 
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to its traditions of relative autonomy, localism and distinctiveness, to the possible detriment 
of a vigorous civil society. 
 
State-voluntary sector relationships:  incorporation or semi-autonomy? 
Despite its indispensable place in social welfare and penal structures, the voluntary (third) 
sector has intermittently featured as an aspect of academic interest or political relevance.iv   
For the most part, charities and voluntary organisations have been hiding in plain sight from 
political (as well as criminological) attention, except during recurrent intervals when the 
voluntary ‘sector’ is  projected as a singular, institutionalised entity and invested with a 
policy functionality which renders it into a purposeful vehicle for the policy agendas of the 
day.   Accordingly, the charitable sector in Britain has been thought of by both political Right 
and Left as having great potential for aligning the civic resources of society with programmes 
for modernising the criminal justice system or bringing about efficiencies and cost reductions 
to public services.  
 
Indeed, an ‘emphatically British’ form of cooperation between state and voluntary agencies 
has evolved which may be thought of as utilitarian and pragmatic. There are some notable 
features to this relationship where ‘historically, the voluntary sector has had far closer links to 
the apparatus of the state than is the case for other countries’.v In the UK, a close 
interconnection between ‘private philanthropic effort and state control’ can be traced back at 
least to the Fabians and Beveridge who designed a role for charitable agencies into the 
architecture of the burgeoning welfare state.  At the peak of the welfare state, the attitude of 
central government tended, if often by benign default, to accept the distinctive and (semi) 
autonomous role of the charitable sector.  Even during this period, concerns were being 
raised that the voluntary sector was being incorporated into a shadow penal state wherein 
crime control agendas migrated beyond state agencies to community level and civic actors.  
 
The debate has been amplified by the inter-penetration of the voluntary sector, the criminal 
justice system and capital markets, which now resembles a tripartite formation.  Accordingly, 
voluntary organisations are said to be increasingly caught in a triple force field, buffeted by 
the influence of commerce, state patronage and induction into the criminal justice apparatus. 
That development goes back to the 1980s in the context of political crisis about crime 
control, overcrowding in prisons, the restructuring of the welfare state and an intellectual 
enthusiasm shaped by the New Right for reforming public services.  Privatising public 
services, in particular, linked economic goals for achieving a lean state with responsibilising 
different branches of government and local authorities to develop responses to crime, crisis in 
prisons and stubbornly high rates of reoffending.  Moreover, these activities ought to create 
cost-savings (‘efficiency’) and demonstrate tangible outcomes.    
 
Under the Conservative government, the Home Office published the White Paper, 
Punishment, Custody and the Community (1988), outlining the potential of adopting US-style 
privatisation for the remand custody and prison systems, alongside the extended utilisation of 
private and voluntary sectors providers for community-based treatment and resettlement 
settlement. Three years later, the Criminal Justice Act (1991) provided the enabling 
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legislation for outsourcing the management of prisons to private sector providers as well as 
stipulating that Probation services contract community-based drug and alcohol support 
services to the voluntary sector.  
 
The New Labour government (1997-2010) saw the sector through the lens of its Third Way 
agenda, associating it with a renewed sense of participatory citizenship as well as an agent for 
steering public services towards competition, choice and performance-based incentives and 
motivations. Despite some clear continuities with their Tory predecessors in seeking to ‘de-
monopolise’ state public services, New Labour regarded the voluntary sector as the missing 
link in a mixed welfare landscape which, alongside commercial providers, could invigorate 
contestability in public services. Finally, involving the charitable sector was a politically 
palatable and attractively modern project, neither statist nor market fundamentalist, which 
garnered enthusiasm from state reformers and the voluntary sector alike.  As Jeremy Kendall 
commented: 
 
‘In the contest over ideas, New Labour could paint the Conservatives as continuing to 
cleave to a reactionary, ‘exhausted’ two sector model build around narrow neo-
liberal (as opposed to broader, historically evolved British New Liberal) or market 
fundamentalist tenets with apparently little or space for a third sector’.vi  
 
The nature of governmental-voluntary sector partnership in this era is best illustrated by the 
Compact on relations between Government and the Voluntary and Community Sector (1998), 
which endorsed a series of undertakings by government departments to have regard for the 
independence of the sector and to consult early on policies affecting the sector. In return, the 
voluntary sector agreed to greater transparency, to consult and include ‘stakeholders’ (policy 
makers, funders and service users) and to support governmental initiatives to extend to 
disenfranchised social groups. In criminal justice, Lord Carter’s Report (2003) Managing 
Offenders - Reducing Crime proposed that supply chains involving third-, private- and 
public-sector providers, which were to be coordinated along managerialist lines of ‘offender 
management’, were the best way to reduce reoffending. Concurrently, work was underway by 
the Cabinet Office and Treasury to professionalise voluntary sector organisations by building 
their capacity to undertake public service contracts. ‘Capacity building’ was aimed at 
developing those traits which the voluntary sector was thought to lack and which must be 
adopted from the private and public sector - managerial and executive skills, business 
promotion and practices, marketing, IT and data-gathering skills, report and evaluation 
capacity, human resources management, meeting 'skills deficits', and leadership. 
 
On the regulatory front, the Charity Act (2006) extended tax exemptions and charitable status 
to a variety of new for-profit/charitable hybrids such as social enterprises or community 
interest companies. In criminal justice, the Offender Management Act (2007) was arguably 
the keystone legislation for advancing a mixed market in criminal justice by making space for 
voluntary sector organisations to enter as potential bidders alongside statutory and private 
competitors. Ministers of Justice were also empowered to direct the privatisation of ‘failing’ 
probation trusts, as well as to specify the proportion of the statutory services’ budgets that 
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were to be spent on outsourcing. The Act continued the process of transforming probation 
trusts and prisons from direct providers to contractors of services. In 2009, the National 
Offender Management Service’s strategic management plan (2009-2011) structured around 
prison expansionism, greater competition and increased ‘efficiency’, offered promising 
potential to new providers.  
 
Under New Labour, the voluntary sector was held close by government as a ‘partner’ and 
source of expertise and ‘voice’, as well as a representing a potential pool of competitors in 
mixed-sector quasi-markets in public services.  Sections of the voluntary sector 
enthusiastically reframed the sector’s raison d’etre in terms of its ‘fit’ with Labour’s 
modernisation agenda. This was reinforced by the self-characterisation of voluntary sector 
organisations as exemplary market players - ‘flexible’, ‘efficient’, competitive, and centred 
on user choice.   A notable example of such lobbying was that undertaken by the Association 
of Chief Executives of Voluntary Organisations (ACEVO) which promoted the outsourcing 
of public services (although criminal justice functions were not specifically or separately 
discussed), and produced a manifesto for ‘replacing the state’ (2003) with 
commercial/charitable consortia. Such enthusiasm for the ‘level playing fields’ of the 
competitive market appears somewhat hubristic in the light of subsequent and highly 
disadvantageous outcomes for the voluntary sector in criminal justice.    
 
In hindsight, the first decade of the century probably represented a high point for 
governmental-voluntary sector interaction. Despite the transient glow of David Cameron’s 
Big Society project, the relationship has conspicuously hardened both in direction and tone.  
In terms of direction, the Coalition government (2010-15) utilised fiscal reduction and the 
broader ‘austerity agenda’ as an adventitious opportunity for further outsourcing custody and 
resettlement services.vii Since then, the clear message from government is that voluntary 
sector participation in the services market is conditional on their playing by the now 
predominant market rules.  The goals have shifted from ‘welfare pluralism’ to ‘mixed 
markets’, in the process placing greater stress on the voluntary sector to be more 
commercially oriented and less reliant on public funding.  
 
In terms of tone, the tenor of exchanges between government and charities has become 
frostier.  It was widely noted by the sector leaders, heads of Trusts and Foundations, and 
some politicians who participated in our study, that there was no major speech or initiative 
involving the voluntary sector after the departure of Michael Gove as Minister of Justice in 
2016.  Equally, several of our interviewees cited examples where senior NOMS personnel 
undermined or actively discouraged critical commentary from reaching Ministers. The 
deteriorating relationships between the voluntary sector and government also reflects a 
traditionalist conservative view of the ‘private’ nature of philanthropy, allied with a greater 
intolerance towards public advocacy, or what government regards as illegitimate criticism or 
lobbying by the charitable sector. 
 
Adaptation in a time of turbulence 
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The following discussion reprises some of the findings of a major research project on 
voluntary sector adaptation and resilience in a mixed penal services market from 2015-17, a 
highly disruptive and unsettled period for the wider social economy.viii  The origins of the 
project are initially to be found in the bigger story of the evolution of the voluntary sector in 
the face of systemic changes which have been widely observed in many countries as well as 
in England & Wales.  Writing originally in 2004 and later in 2015, Lester Salamon, an 
authority on the international voluntary sector, wrote that ‘nonprofit America’ had undergone 
a quiet revolution in the previous four decades which had led to ‘a massive process of 
reinvention and re-engineering which was still ongoing’.ix  The ‘non-profit’ sector, he argued, 
was reshaped by significant external changes most particularly associated with shifts from a 
social democratic to neoliberal political climate.  These ‘field altering influences’ included 
the rise of the ‘post-industrial’ economy, new demographic trends in the volunteer and staff 
base, the transformative capacity of technology, and the growing influence of private wealth 
and competitive markets.  In apparent contradiction, Salamon concluded that while the sector 
had responded ‘brilliantly and resiliently’ to several dominant pressures, significant 
components of the sector had ‘moved far from the sweet spot that has historically earned the 
sector public trust’. 
 
This project set out to empirically test these propositions against evidence that was 
systematically gathered from the field, that is, by researching how actors in the voluntary 
sector, criminal justice, policy and finance domains, for example, were shaping as well as 
being influenced by events. We focused on the specific, specialist field of criminal justice, 
which, in addition to experiencing to the structural changes identified by Salamon, was also 
affected by stubborn problems such as a rising prison population, high levels of reoffending, 
sentence inflation, and the apparent ineffectiveness of soaring expenditure in tackling crime. 
As the research sought to gauge possible degrees and forms of ‘subornment’ by more 
powerful political or economic interests, it was important to pay close attention to the 
tensions between theories of incorporation and potentially more nuanced, complex realities 
on the ground.  
 
Methodology 
The research took place in England and Wales between April 2015 to March 2017. Data were 
gathered to allow systematic analysis of the conditions under which ‘elite’ individuals in the 
voluntary sector and related fields (policy, contracting and commissioning, criminal justice 
administration) interpreted their environment, planned for exigencies and shaped their 
organisations’ responses to changing conditions.  
 
A mixed method approach was utilised as the most appropriate methodological approach for 
capturing complex, responsive social and organisational movements.  
 
Academic, policy and evaluative research relevant to the voluntary sector in criminal justice 
resettlement was systematically reviewed.  Statistical data were gathered from surveys of 
CEOs or managers, (57 responses), and to volunteers and staff in our case study organisations 
(24 responses).  The surveys were administered electronically. A subset of questions salient 
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to this project was also included in Clinks’ State of the Sector surveys covering the years 
2015 and 2016, to broaden our sweep and to track significant movements over the research 
period.x 
 
Substantial data were collected from a series of individual and group interviews. Respondents 
came from one of three groups: (1) 141 senior voluntary sector managers, directors and 
trustees; heads of grant-making trusts; (2) 31 service commissioners, politicians, civil 
servants, executive level staff in Community Rehabilitation Companies, the National 
Probation Service, the judiciary, prison service and Police and Crime Commissioners, and; 
(3) 33 staff working in direct delivery of services and some volunteers. Altogether we spoke 
to 205 individuals from 110 organisations.  
 
Additionally, 10 organisations participated in an in-depth study, allowing us access to their 
documentation, to attend and observe boards, training programmes, service user forums and 
operations. Interviews were conducted with trustees, board members, senior managers, staff 
and volunteers. The identities of participants and organisations are anonymised.  
 
Findings 
For the purposes of analytical clarity we identified a number of drivers influencing 
organisational responses, analogous to ‘force fields’ or field-altering influences that proved to 
be unusually disruptive to the voluntary sector and resettlement fields. These drivers are: 
marketisation, professionalisation, penal drift and (dis)embededness. They are not meant to 
be exclusive or exhaustive categories which capture every aspect of the forces shaping the 
voluntary sector. Rather, they encapsulate highly fluid and rapidly-changing conditions 
which are shaping the opportunities, constraints and available options in the criminal justice 
field.  
 
• Marketisation 
Marketisation refers to the set of principles, rules procedures and technologies (such as the 
law and contracts) that are informed by a political project, neoliberalism. That project seeks 
to radically reduce state ownership and control over public services by reconstructing the 
social economy on the basis of localised responsibility, citizen consumer-choice, 
deregulation,  de-unionisation, and competitive selection by outsourcing or privatisation. 
Several Coalition, and later, Conservative policies specifically impacted on the voluntary 
sector. The Transforming Rehabilitation [TR] programme, which split the probation service 
in England and Wales and contracted out most of their assets and personnel to 21 Community 
Rehabilitation Companies, had a largely disruptive impact on local service networks, but 
initial interest from the voluntary sector fell away as the much-vaunted subcontracting model 
failed to matarialise. A second factor entailed the ‘downwards shift’ in governance onto 
meso-level authorities such as elected Police and Crime Commissioners or ‘autonomous’ 
prison governors with responsibility (and much reduced budgets). A third factor was shift 
from grant funding to competitive contracting. Although central governmental contract 
spending rose, contracts were for fewer, higher value, single area tenders which benefitted 
large charitable providers. It transpired from our findings that austerity was by far the most 
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disruptive factor to funding.  Contracting out to the voluntary sector fell from an overall peak 
of 12.1 billion GBP in 2009-10 (under the last New Labour government) to 1.1billion GBP in 
2011, and continued to fall under the Coalition government. This confirmed ‘a turning of the 
tide [which] relegated the third sector to a second-tier partner’.xi Smaller and medium-sized 
charities were doubly jeopardised both by the decline in grant spending and swingeing cuts to 
local government spending, which is their principal source of funding. In the light of such 
uncertainty in the funding climate, our participating organisations adopted the following 
strategies to maintain funding levels:  
 
• Market scoping and competitive entrepreneurialism 
The majority of senior managers reported that a more explicitly commercialised and 
competitive environment prompted them to become more ‘market savvy’ and entrepreneurial.  
This manifested in strategies for diversifying their core services into specialisms offered by 
‘growth’ areas of funding such as young offenders, offenders with mental ill-health or 
addictions, and military veterans.  Others expanded into new ‘markets’ and ‘territories, which 
both took them out of their original area as they geographically expanded into adjoining 
regions. Whereas, this entrepreneurialism supported ‘scaling up’ for smaller and medium-
sized charities, it also displaced other charities from their original locales and beneficiary 
group.  Indeed, charities were both vulnerable to displacement by ‘outsiders’, as well as 
migrating into others’ ‘territories’ in pursuit of contracts:  
 
The work is getting larger scale and more regional, so that the local networks are 
getting left out, and that’s a pity (CEO, Victims’ Services).  
 
We’ve had experience of losing contracts to people who have come in with no 
knowledge of the area – both of the geographic area and the actual service you’re 
working - and they have messed it up.  This has happened even with things we have 
developed (CEO, Offender Support). 
 
• Mergers and acquisitions as a growth strategy 
Although the ‘supercharity’ phenomenon is not as evident in criminal justice as in the generic 
voluntary sector, some were able to grow rapidly and expand to a national scale. The main 
trends were mergers between medium-sized entities or absorption with larger ones, and 
secondly, VSOs entering commercial partnerships with the private sector. Expansion was 
largely driven by the pursuit of economies of scale and commissioners’ preferences for large-
scale, single area contracts.   Some ‘mergers’ more closely resembled ‘takeovers’ allowing 
the bigger party to acquire capabilities, assets, specialist expertise and competitive advantage 
in new territories.  
 
 ‘We did three mergers in a year.  We actively sought out mergers to move us into new 
geography and new markets …And they took us into the southern market ..because 
unless you’re in London, you can’t break into the London market’ (CEO, Large 
charity).  
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The quote above is taken from an organisation that had rapidly expanded from a base in one 
region and in core housing support to becoming a major social enterprise with national reach. 
On the other side of the equation, this VSO sought out a merger because its survival had 
become parlous as a consequence of taking on contract commitment which had led to 
significant losses: ‘It was very, very clear that we were not going to be able to withstand that 
loss. So, the board started looking for merger partners and openly going out to do that’ 
(Director, Employment charity).  
 
A combination of shrinking funding sources and contract competition created incentives to 
emulate growth strategies from the business sector in order to maintain a competitive edge. 
One charitable director explained that their joint contract with a large private sector 
corporation enabled them to compete with ‘… the big boys, if you like, you know, we're 
bidding against giants you might say, that is always a risk.  And in some ways, it can 
monopolise the market that you see the usual suspects at the table all the time (Director, 
Community Rehabilitation Company partner) 
 
However, mergers and acquisitions provoked concerns that ‘predatory’ and ‘corporatist’ 
behaviour was driving cultural change in the sector.  Whilst some organisations were 
criticised for mercenary and opportunistic behaviour, those expanding or taking over 
organisations defended the strategy on the grounds that growth was not only necessary for 
reaching greater levels of need, but brought investment for innovation, helped struggling 
services survive, and injected necessary business realism into the sector. These claims 
sounded hollow in other quarters. On closer examination, however, we found that most 
charity managers believed that altruistic and business oriented approaches could work in 
tandem, rather than aligning neatly into moral or ideological opposites.  
 
• Professionalisation  
‘Professionalisation’ has accelerated in a climate in which commercial ability and 
technocratic performance are paramount. Professional capacity and skills have existed in the 
voluntary sector for decades if one references the specialist knowledge and ‘case work’ and 
social work approaches that have long featured in voluntary services. However, working 
more closely alongside statutory and commercial agencies has stimulated a demand for the 
qualities that enable charities to operate in competitive and bureaucratically demanding 
criminal justice services. For analytical clarity, the different components of 
professionalisation were investigated separately, albeit slightly artificially, at the level of 
organisational efficiency, and secondly, at the level of practice and service delivery.  
 
Most of the directors and senior managers of voluntary sector organisations had significantly 
invested in areas such as business systems, financial management, data gathering and 
informational technology.  They generally concurred with rationales that linked ‘efficiency’ 
with the effective use of public funds. Nevertheless, ‘delivering to contract’ in supply 
partnerships encouraged frequent and disruptive demands for voluminous data which were 
related to contract performance and audit purposes which bore little relationship to the reality 
of their work and its potential impact:  
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‘We’re working as a subcontractor … The day to day operations are affected because 
we’re regularly inspected.  We spend too much time on keeping records and sharing 
records with the bigger organisation’ (CEO, Housing Support).  
 
Expert professionalism materialised in changes to practice and service delivery as staff were 
nudged towards ‘objective’ and ‘distanced’ dispositions towards ‘clients’, ‘customers’ or 
‘service users’.  This shift was attributed to the adoption of more ‘criminogenic’ interventions 
such as treatment, diagnostic and risk-based models which obtain Ministry of Justice 
accredition (and hence are more attractive on the contract market). Staff were encouraged to 
adhere to formal rules, regulations and procedures more explicitly. Many viewed these as 
deskilling trends which dispensed with their experience and judgement in favour of 
depersonalised case-processing. Deskilling tended to be more pronounced where the terms of 
contract obliged organisations to deliver truncated and simplified versions of their full, 
original programmes for cost efficiency purposes. In the view of a senior manager in a 
charitable arm of a Community Rehabilitation Company: ‘A lot of our staff who have been 
involved in the previous models have said that it feels like a watered-down version … This 
passionate staff group that we’ve developed and trained, all of a sudden, they’re faced with a 
model that doesn’t quite go as far as it used to’.  
 
• Penal drift  
The general phenomenon of ‘mission drift’, whereby VSOs are pulled into the orbit of the 
priorities, values, reference groups or approaches of more powerful state or commercial 
funders, is widely understood.  We reformulated this concept into ‘penal drift’ to adapt it to 
the peculiar imperatives of the criminal justice field, which differs from most other public 
service fields in that it carries responsibilities for discharging sanctions passed by the courts. 
This obligation was legislatively underlined in the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (sch. 16, part 
1), which directs that ‘all community sentences must have a punitive element’.  For VSOs, 
this creates legal and ethical quandaries as it introduces coercive elements into their methods 
and relationships with clients. Penal drift encapsulates intersecting governing imperatives.  
The first is that VSOs themselves become subjects of audit regimes. Secondly, and as a 
consequence, they must adopt monitoring regimes and practices as statutory duties. Thirdly, 
in practice, attitudes, language and approaches to clients are reformulated in more 
‘criminogenic’ terms. Fourthly, that practices, methods, information sharing and other 
practices increasingly reflect criminal justice priorities and values.  
 
These were matters on which interviewees were divided along the lines of responsibility, 
especially between frontline workers and management. Workers in the sector are used to 
working with service users on an entirely consensual basis, and some felt that that imposing 
compulsory attendance under the threat of ‘breaching’ a client was detrimental to the trust 
relations with service users.   
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 ‘This isn't a service that people engage with because they want to, they engage with it 
because they have to.  And that will always be a massive barrier to service user 
integration within this particular service’ (Service Manager, Justice Services Org). 
 
By contrast, senior managers tended to take the view that in taking on contracts to deliver 
aspects of court sentences they had a duty to act, albeit indirectly, as an agent of the criminal 
justice system. Some of these rationales might be regarded as ‘techniques of neutralisation’ 
by which individuals (or organisations) direct responsibility for ambivalent or contentious 
problems to external forces or causes. Many pointed to the plethora of safeguarding 
procedures and risk-assessment strategies passed down from statutory authorities or funders 
which putatively protected clients’ interests. Others emphasised that they had voluntarily 
obtained written consent from service users which gave permission to report breach of their 
terms of supervision to the authorities. A minority of organisations chose not to accept 
‘responsible agency’ status. For example, one CEO who had doubts about this aspect of the 
work had sought clarification from a CRC as what the obligations of a ‘responsible agent’ 
were.  She had been told that there was no issue of conflict here as being returned to custody 
was ultimately the offenders’ personal responsibility: ‘[I was told that] the Prime doesn’t 
breach an individual: she breaches herself’ (CEO, women’s service). This organisation 
withdrew from negotiations.  
 
• Dislocation and the muting of voice 
Our findings point to the waning sense of an assured identity and standing as a respected 
entity in civil society, which is believed to be under attack or weakened as a relatively 
autonomous sphere by political and market interests. In practice, there have always been 
conflicts in reconciling mutually conflicting affinities as voluntary bodies align with their 
diverse constituencies with their differing demands, such as the state, other sectors, the 
public, and policy-makers. In the past, the voluntary sector has legitimately, and adroitly, 
adopted a ‘Janus-faced’ strategy in order to operate on many fronts. Nevertheless, it may be 
argued that a cluster of recent developments is placing greater strains on these certitudes. 
This processhas been liked to a ‘great unsettlement’ for the voluntary sector where 
‘resources, relationships, approaches and understandings’ that existed previously are 
increasingly ‘called into question’.xii To this insight we add an ‘unsettlement’, or splitting,  of 
the state-voluntary sector consensus as the social democratic model of public welfare makes a 
transition towards a marketised model.   
 
As previously illustrated, the ‘force fields’ to which voluntary organisations are exposed are 
taking many in sometimes irreconcilable directions. This is reflected in the predominantly 
functionalist characterisation of the charitable/voluntary sector in policy discourse as 
synonymous with ‘service providers’ willing to undertake contracted work for the state. The 
rest of the sector – advocates, legal reformers, critics of government policy, those promoting 
alternative approaches to punishment or imprisonment – have not only been placed on the 
periphery of this relationship, but advocacy itself has become a source of conflict and 
contention.  That was exemplified by the Transparency of Lobbying, Non-party Campaigning 
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and Trade Union Administration Act (2014).  Enacted to tackle corruption, the Act draws 
charitable campaigning into its orbit on the same basis as corporate lobbying. Equally, 
measures such as the ‘anti-lobbying clause’, which prohibited VSOs from using ‘taxpayer 
funds’ to engage in public advocacy or advertising, seemed to be aimed at disciplining the 
sector as much as protecting the use of public funds. This was later ‘paused’. Recent, highly-
publicised closures generated a sense of diminished confidence in the sector about speaking 
out, prompting many individual VSOs to focus on reputational safeguarding.  
 
I think also what happened, unfortunately, with Kids Company and Age Concern very 
recently, even on the grant side, there’s probably going to be change (CEO, Justice 
Services). 
 
The practice of inserting confidentiality- or non-disclosure conditions into service contracts is 
now more common in criminal justice service commissioning. One CEO reflected on his 
response when offered a contract with stipulations against ‘damaging the reputation of the 
[CRC] prime’: 
 
I guess on one level, the fact that we're in contract negotiations, the whole process 
has to be wrapped up in a lot of confidentiality, it means that we're not free to speak 
out in a more campaigning way (CEO, Addiction services). 
 
These misgivings were not entirely shared, however.  Other CEOs opined that the perception 
of risk posed by some of these clauses was greater than the reality:   
 
There’s absolute power in the third sector, but the third sector’s not brave enough to 
exercise it.  And that’s a disappointment to me’ (CEO, large charity ). 
 
Conclusion 
The article has presented findings from the first phase of the research relating to the 
necessary adaptive repositioning that has taken place within individual VSOs in criminal 
justice, which in turn reflects broader sector-wide adjustments to a period of exceptional and 
unusual turbulence. We found environmental and ‘field-shaping’ changes deriving from the 
rising role of markets both as cultural and economic forces in society at large under late 
capitalism. Far from liberating providers from red-tape, marketisation generates new forms of 
scrutiny as the state demands public accountability for taxpayer’s money, while investors 
require detailed micro-data on the performance of their investments. Hence, the explosion of 
bureaucratic, managerialist effort in criminal justice ‘delivery’, following that in health, 
education, and social care, for example, seems to be aimed at fulfilling the economists’ rule 
that ‘perfect markets require perfect information’. Well-intentioned policies for bringing the 
voluntary sector into the ‘mainstream’ have revealed a tendency towards instrumentalism, of 
both state-building or market-building kinds. Successive governments have been unable to 
get to grip with the complexity of relationships between the voluntary sector, business, and 
government and, therefore, revert to bureaucratic and regulatory default positions.  More 
disturbing are the signs that political parties, once in government, reveal an authoritarian 
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impulse to curb or discipline civil society actors through manipulation of the purse strings, 
legislation, marginalising dissent or equating malpractices in some areas with those of the 
entire sector. More positively, despite meeting unprecedented changes, the data also show 
that many in the sector act according to principles, approaches and philosophies that they 
deem to be indispensable to the notion of doing good the voluntary sector way. Our next step 
will be to identify, analyse and explain resilience and pushback from the sector, despite its 
weakened status in many respects. That research is aimed at identifying the ‘core conditions’ 
relating to the voluntary sector contribution to social justice where it impinges on criminal 
justice, and where its boundaries ought consensually to be drawn. Until these issues are 
explicitly addressed, the prospect of plural and diverse public services which are the common 
responsibility of all interests in society remain distant.  
 
                                                 
i We refer to ‘the state’ when referring to points where voluntary sector organisations engage with state 
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